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ABSTRACT
Many internet ventures rely on advertising for their revenue. How-
ever, users feel discontent by the presence of ads on the websites
they visit, as the data-size of ads is often comparable to that of the
actual content. This has an impact not only on the loading time of
webpages, but also on the internet bill of the user in some cases. In
absence of a mutually-agreed procedure for opting out of advertise-
ments, many users resort to ad-blocking browser-extensions.
In this work, we study the performance of popular ad-blockers on
a large set of news websites. Moreover, we investigate the benets
of ad-blockers on user privacy as well as the mechanisms used by
websites to counter them. Finally, we explore the trac overhead
due to the ad-blockers themselves.
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INTRODUCTION
Ad-blocking is now a widespread practice among web users. Ac-
cording to current estimates, it is employed by around 200 million
desktop and 300 million mobile users, a user base that still grows
at 40% annually [7]. The same estimates indicate that ad-blocking
translates into signicant losses for publishers, reaching 41 billion
US dollars for 2016. It is therefore not surprising that there is an
arms race between publishers and advertisers, on one hand, and
ad-blocking tools (or ‘ad-blockers’), on the other1. In this context,
it is clear that understanding the mechanisms implemented by
ad-blockers and their eects is of wide and continuous interest.
In this paper, we study a number of popular ad-blockers and
analyze their performance in desktop and mobile settings for a large
number of webpages. Specically, we employ the ad-blockers on
two sets of webpages: one consisting of the front pages of popular
news websites; and another consisting of around 30,000 web articles.
1https://techcrunch.com/2016/08/11/facebooks-blocker-blocking-ads-blocked-by-
blockers/
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For each webpage, we collect a number of measures that describe
the browser workload with and without the use of an ad-blocker –
including, for instance, the amount of data loaded, the load-time of
webpages, or the number of data requests. Our results indicate that
ad-blockers decrease the data consumption signicantly, though
the benets in terms of load times are limited. Moreover, by taking
a deeper look into the set of requests incurred by websites and ad-
blockers, we identify cases where the websites attempt to counter
the ad-blockers, but also requests that the ad-blockers incur on their
own. Finally, we investigate the extent to which ad-blockers pre-
vent the transfer of user-tracking information, resulting in privacy
benets for users. When comparing a range of dierent ad-blockers,
we nd that uBlock performs the best, in terms of both data savings
and user-tracking.
RELATEDWORK
Online Advertising Advertising has emerged as one of the main
sources of revenue on the web [2]. On one hand, advertisers claim
that ads on the web help keep most parts of the web free for con-
sumers [1]. On the other hand, consumers nd advertising annoying
and obstructive. In one study, the New York Times analyzed the
top 50 news websites2 and found that more than half of all data
came from ads.
Moreover, many users perceive web ads as a threat to privacy [3]
and tracking is cited as one of the most common reasons for users
to install ad-blockers [6]. This is corroborated by many studies
that show large scale tracking behavior on the web [3, 9]. For
instance, Yu et al. [12] nd that 95% of the pages visited contain
3rd party requests to potential trackers and 78% attempt to transfer
unsafe data. To counter tracking, ad-blockers also remove tracking
buttons (such as Facebook’s ‘like’ button) and protect their users
from known malware domains.
Ad blocking In [4], the authors propose methods to detect the
users who have installed an ad-blocker and characterize ad-block
usage for a large set (2 millions) of users. In addition, they give
details on demographics and geographic penetration of ad-blockers
on the web. In [8], the authors analyze the use of two ad-blockers,
AdblockPlus and Ghostery, on web trac data from a European ISP.
They show that there is a drop in requests to third party services
when using ad-block and estimate that around 18% of the trac is
due to ads. There are a few dierences between our study and theirs:
(i) their study handles only two ad-blockers, (ii) with a constant
battle between advertisers and ad-blockers, the ad-blocking and
counter ad-blocking scene has been changing over the last few
years, and so have some of the related performance measurements.
2http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/01/business/cost-of-mobile-ads.html
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(iii) our study handles in-html ads, which are used by advertisers
nowadays to bypass ad-blocking.
In [11], the authors classify third party trackers into various cat-
egories including ad trackers, analytics, social, etc and compare the
performance of various ad-blocking tools with respect to blocking
these third party requests. They nd that there is a lot of variance in
the type of requests that are blocked by each ad-blocker. They then
look deeper into the individual default and possible congurations
of these ad-blockers and study the changes in blocking capabilities
with the dierent settings.
There have been privacy concerns with ad-blockers too. Many
popular ad-blockers (including AdBlock and AdblockPlus) partici-
pate in the Acceptable Ads program3, allowing ‘non-intrusive’ ads
to go through. For an extensive study on the issue see [10].
To counter the eects of increasing ad-blocking, advertisers are
relying on counter-ad-blocking tools. In [5], the authors study their
use on the most popular ve thousand websites and nd that at
least 6.7% of these sites use them.
DATA
We analyze two datasets, chosen to capture potential dierences
between content-heavy homepages of large websites and individual
webpages.
Top150 This is a list of the top 150 news websites, as ranked by
Alexa4. For each of them, we have a URL that points to the website
homepage, for both its desktop and mobile version (unless the latter
does not exist).
GDELT A list of 30,000 URLs pointing to dierent news articles
published on a single day (November 8, 2016). The list was obtained
from GDELT5, a project that collects news stories from all around
the world over the years.
We load the webpage of each URL with a clean instance of
Chrome browser (no cached content or extensions), using the Se-
lenium Python library6 on a Macbook pro with 8 cores, with no
other major processes running. On each load, we capture the HAR
le for the load. The HAR (HTTP Archive File) is a JSON-formatted
le that captures the interactions between the browser and the
website, including network requests, types and size of objects, and
load times.
We load the same URL in six browser modes, all simultaneously:
a vanilla mode (no ad-blocker), and one mode for each of ve ad-
blockers. The ad-blockers are AdBlock7, AdblockPlus8, Ghostery9,
uBlock10 and Privacy Badger11 – chosen from the most popular
ad-blockers on the Chrome Store. For the Top150 dataset, we also
load the mobile version of the page (as loaded on Google Nexus 5)
using Selenium’s mobile emulation tool12. Note that, though we
3https://acceptableads.com/
4http://www.alexa.com/topsites/category/News/Newspapers. We processed the list
manually and removed a few which were not standard news sites (e.g. reddit.com)
5http://gdeltproject.org/
6http://selenium-python.readthedocs.io/
7https://getadblock.com/
8https://adblockplus.org
9https://www.ghostery.com/
10https://www.ublock.org
11https://www.e.org/privacybadger
12https://sites.google.com/a/chromium.org/chromedriver/mobile-emulation
report the data about mobile websites with and without ad-block,
the ad-blockers used were for the desktop version. There are no
ad-blockers for the mobile version of Chrome and none for any
of the Android browsers. Our datasets and code can be accessed
here13.
FINDINGS
This section details our ndings on the eciency of ad-blockers,
the ad-blocker benets on user privacy, the counter-measures used
by advertisers, and nally the trac load that ad-blockers incur on
their own.
Ad-blocker Eciency
For each URL and setting (desktop or mobile, with or without ad-
blocker), we collect measures that describe the average performance
of the browser in loading the webpages of a dataset. The measures
include: the number of distinct domains for all HTTP requests
performed during loading; the maximum number of threads that
run concurrently at any point; the total number of HTTP requests;
the total size of downloaded and uploaded data; the cumulative time
for loading the webpage, obtained by summing up the durations
of all requests; and, nally, the wall-clock time. We acquire these
statistics by parsing the HAR les.
The number of distinct domains indicate the number of dierent
parties that acquire information of the user, such as IP address and
the user-agent string (contains device type, name and version of
browser and OS, etc). The number of HTTP requests and maximum
number of concurrent threads give an indication of the load on the
user’s machine. The amount of transferred data, and the cumulative
and wall-clock time aect the user experience.
Figures 1 and 2 show the results for the desktop and mobile
versions of the Top150 webpages; and Figure 3 for the GDELT
webpages. Numbers represent the ratio of the measures over the
vanilla mode – for example, a value of 0.6 for the number of domains
means that using an ad-blocker loads 60% the number of domains
compared to using no ad-blocker.
We nd that: (i) All ad-blockers except Ghostery give around 25-
34% savings in the amount of data transferred (on average). This is a
bit higher than the 18% saving reported by [8] and 13-34% reported
by [11]. Ghostery is the exception because it is not an ad-blocking
tool per se, but gives a choice for a user to track who is tracking
them and block those of their choice. So by default Ghostery does
not block any content. We still include it in all our measurements,
as it still makes sense to study it in other analysis cases that follow
in this section. (ii) On average, there is an increase in the wall
clock time when using an ad-blocker, even as the cumulative time
decreases for some of the ad-blockers. This means that ad-blockers
incur overhead, but block ad-related threads that were meant to run
in parallel while loading content; this overhead is not necessarily
experienced by the user, since various scripts can often run in the
background, after the important content has loaded. (iii) uBlock
gives the best performance, both in terms of data and time saved.
13https://users.ics.aalto./kiran/adblock/
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Figure 1: Performance benchmark when using an ad-
blocker on the desktop version of Top150, normalized over
the vanilla mode.
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Figure 2: Performance benchmark when using an ad-
blocker on the mobile version of Top150, normalized over
the vanilla mode. Privacy Badger was discarded because of
inconsistencies in the data collection.
Benets for User Privacy
By examining the HTTP requests issued by the browser when load-
ing a webpage, we notice that a signicant amount of these are
intended for tracking the users’ behaviour. We attempt to quantify
the potential privacy hazard for the user when accessing a webpage
by analyzing the parameters passed through these requests. Speci-
cally, to measure the impact of potentially privacy invading requests
when using no ad-blocker, we manually examined the tracking pa-
rameters from the request headers and found nine frequently used
tracking parameters that accompanied a large set of requests. The
parameters were: ‘pixel’, ’track’, ‘google_gid’, ‘user_id’, ‘partnerid’,
‘partnerUID’, ‘partner_device_id’, ‘uid’, ‘user_cookie’. The presence
of these parameters oers a high-precision method to identify user-
tracking, although we currently do not quantify its recall.
Figure 4 shows the fraction of requests containing one, two and
three tracking parameters in a request when using an ad-blocker,
again normalized over the vanilla mode. We can see from the gure
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Figure 3: Performance measures when using an ad-blocker
on the GDELT dataset, normalized over the vanilla mode.
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Figure 4: Fraction of distinct requests containing tracking
keywords for one, two and three tracking parameters. The
black text in the red bar shows the total number of requests
containing these tracking parameters in the vanilla mode.
that, again, uBlock achieves near-perfect performance, whereas
other ad-blockers (except Ghostery) block about 60-80% of requests
with such parameters. The performance remains the same, when
considering requests with dierent numbers of tracking parameters,
though the total number of requests goes down exponentially.
Blocking the Ad-blockers
Online ventures relying on advertising try to counter to the ad-
blocking tools [5]. In our analysis, we witness several techniques
for countering ad-blockers, with dierent goals. In certain cases,
the goal is simply to detect whether the browser has an active ad-
blocking extension. Upon detection, a message is rendered on the
webpage and noties the user about the tool. This message may
simply notify the user that the tool interferes with the content and
the user-experience. Other times, the message blocks the user from
accessing the actual content, until they have turned o the tool. In
more extreme cases, the goal is to circumvent the ad-blocking tool
altogether.
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Table 1: Additional Domains loaded by Ad-blockers
Ad-blocker Extra domains loaded
AdBlock mixpanel.com, stripe.com
Adblock Plus quantserve.com,crwdcntrl.net
Ghostery selectmedia.asia, streamrail.com
adlooxtracking.com
Privacy Badger cdnjs.com
uBlock Twitter widgets
We examine again the HTTP requests performed when loading
a webpage and look for specic Javascript modules designed to
counter ad-blocking, such as blockadblock.js, inn-anti-
adblock, and adblock html cache buster. When web-
pages from the GDELT dataset are loaded in the vanilla mode (no
ad-blockers), we nd more than 3,260 webpages (10.8%) with ex-
plicit attempts to determine if any ad-blocking tool is used. When
AdBlock or AdblockPlus is activated, the number of webpages
rises to 10,097 and 10,226 (33%), respectively, indicating that a large
portion of webpages actively track the usage of these ad-blockers.
When the other tools are used, the number of webpages with such
requests is not as high; 15, 9, 8% of the webpages for Ghostery,
Privacy Badger, and uBlock respectively. The variation in
numbers between AdBlock and AdblockPlus, on one hand, and the
rest of the ad-blockers, on the other, can be explained by the popu-
larity of the former – but also the eectiveness of the ad-blockers
in blocking such requests.
Requests due to Ad-blockers
In this section, we try to dissect what additional requests are made
when using an ad-blocker. Consider the set of HTTP requests re-
quired to render a webpage in the vanilla mode, denoted by V . Let
B be the set of requests when using an ad-blocking tool, then we de-
ne A = V\B as the identied advertisements, and C = V∩B as
the “true” content of the page. Finally, E = B \V is “extra” content
loaded due to or by the ad-blocking tool. Unsurprisingly, the most
popular domains found in A are googlesyndication.com
and doubleclick.net, in accordance to previous studies, and
blocked (characterized as ads) by all tools.
A more interesting question is to identify the “extra” E requests
that incur exclusively at the presence by ad-blockers and to look
for potential leakages in information14. The domains which most
frequently occur only in E are shown in Table 1. In many cases, we
notice that E contains well-known ad-serving or visitor-tracking
domains. This clearly demonstrates that the tools are not perfect
and are sometimes bypassed.
For AdBlock, we notice that mixpanel.com appears in 5,125
(17%) of the webpages when using AdBlock, versus 170 (< 1%)
of original pages (vanilla mode). This is a Google Analytics-like web-
site that tracks visits by users of AdBlock. Similarly,stripe.com,
an online payments platform through which users can donate to
AdBlock is added to 2,616 (8%) of the webpages, compared to 40
(< 0.1%) with out ad-blocking.
14e.g. http://thehackernews.com/2016/11/web-of-trust-addon.html
For Adblockplus, we notice an increase for quantserve
.com (an audience-measurement website) from 14% to 21% and for
crwdcntrl.net (another audience-measurement website) from
21% to 29% For Ghostery, we notice selectmedia.asia (a
video-ad serving company) appears in 1,374 (4.6%) webpages’ re-
quests, compared to 47 (< 0.1%) in the vanilla mode, streamrail.
com (another video-ad serving company) 1,488 times (5%) versus 63,
and adlooxtracking.com (ad tracking company) 2,190 times
(7%) versus 240 (< 1%). For PrivacyBadger, cdnjs.com (a
repository for open-source web-libraries) stands out with 2,130
webpages (7%). For uBlock we did not witness any signicant
increase for suspicious domains; but we did notice an increase for
Twitter widgets from 11% to 20% of the webpages.
Our preliminary ndings indicate that though ad-blockers block
external ads and third party trackers to varying degrees, they intro-
duce various tracking services of their own. This is a novel nding
and has potential impact on users privacy. We leave a detailed
analysis on this for future work.
Conclusions This paper provides a rst look at the performance
and privacy aspects of popular ad-blocking tools. Based on our
analysis, we conclude that (i) uBlock has the best performance,
in terms of ad and third party tracker ltering, and least privacy
tracking, (ii) The time to load pages is not necessarily faster when
using adblockers, and (iii) this is partly the case due to additional
trackers and libraries introduced by the adblocking tools. As ad-
blockers try to monetise their business by selling ads themselves,
our datasets and ndings could be used (i) by users, to get an idea
on which adblocker to choose, from an increasingly competitive set
of providers, and (ii) by researchers, as building blocks for further
analysis on privacy and tracking behaviors by ad-blocking tools.
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